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 THE RELEVANCE OF FOREIGN EXAMPLES TO 
LEGAL DEVELOPMENT 
JOHN BELL* 
INTRODUCTION 
 The use of foreign legal sources in legal argument is commonplace. 
It is an integral part of the way lawyers work. The use of such arguments in 
American constitutional law may be controversial, but it is widely practiced 
in other branches of the law, even by those who complain about the use 
made of foreign sources in constitutional law.1 But it is possible to 
overstate the importance of the argument from “elsewhere,” as Martin 
Loughlin described it.2 This Article seeks to make sense of the argument 
from foreign sources drawing principally on work undertaken for the 
European Legal Development project which I headed with David Ibbetson. 
In the light of that project, it is possible to engage with the justifications 
offered by leading authors Markesinis and Waldron for the use of foreign 
law. This Article argues that a justification based on foreign sources is not 
essentially a free-standing justification, but rather gives additional luster to 
arguments that can be based on existing domestic law sources by showing 
that they illustrate a principle or value shared by a number of other legal 
systems. 
 By contrast, Markesinis presents the major pragmatic argument that 
foreign law offers a distinct justification for a legal result in that foreign 
law contains useful lessons for domestic law.3 He argues that this can be 
achieved if academic lawyers package the foreign law in ways that make it 
accessible to the practitioners (judges and counsel in cases). Waldron4 
 
 * Professor of Law (1973), University of Cambridge, U.K. This is the revised version of my 
Berstein Lecture given at the Duke University School of Law in February 2010.  
 1. Jusice Scalia is perhaps the most prominent example. See e.g.,Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 598 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 622-28 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); see also BASIL MARKESINIS WITH JÖRG FEDTKE, ENGAGING WITH FOREIGN LAW 195-203 
(2d ed. 2009). 
 2. Martin Loughlin, The Importance of Elsewhere, 4 PUB. L. REV. 44, 56-7 (1993). 
 3. See generally Basil Markesinis & Jörg Fedtke, The Judge as Comparatist, 80 TUL. L. REV. 11 
(2005). 
 4. Jeremy Waldron, Treating Like Cases Alike in the World: The Theoretical Basis of the 
Demand for Legal Unity, in HIGHEST COURTS AND GLOBALISATION 99, 109 (Sam Muller & Sidney 
Richards eds., 2010) [hereinafter HIGHEST COURTS]. 
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offers a more principled justification. He suggests that we need to examine 
foreign law essentially out of concerns for equality before the law. 
 In discussing this topic, we need to distinguish the process of 
discovery (how we should go about making a decision) and the process of 
justification (why anyone should accept our decision as correct in law).5 
The mere fact that we examine foreign legal arguments as part of the 
process of discovering what the law is does not mean that these arguments 
provide a justification for a decision by a judge. Markesinis’s utility 
argument predominantly addresses the process of discovery, whereas 
Waldron’s argument is more closely directed at the process of justification. 
This Article focuses its attention on the place of foreign law as a 
justification for a domestic decision. 
 My argument will be developed in two phases. First, I will present 
examples of the place of foreign law in the development of private law in 
Europe. In the second Part, I will relate the conclusions to the arguments of 
Waldron on why one should take account of foreign law in domestic legal 
decisions. 
 
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM 
 In what situations does the problem arise of citing foreign legal 
arguments as a justification for a legal decision? There are three situations 
in which a foreign legal principle may feature in the justifications that a 
national lawyer gives for a decision. They can be illustrated as follows: 
(a) A national court applying an international treaty may justify its 
decision by citing the decision of another national court of a state party 
to that treaty. For instance, a Danish decision interpreting the Geneva 
Convention on refugees would provide a reason in its own right that 
the Convention has a particular meaning for a country like the UK, 
which is also a signatory. The Danish decision’s argumentative weight 
comes essentially from the Convention, but it is a concretization of it. 
A domestic lawyer really has no problem with this situation. The 
national legal order either incorporates the Convention or has an 
interpretative obligation to make the national law compatible as far as 
possible with treaty law. So it is appropriate to examine foreign 
decisions on a provision that is shared by both systems. 
(b) Within the common law, courts of one jurisdiction are used to 
citing decisions of other common law courts that apply the same 
principles. For instance, an Australian decision on tort law offers both 
an example of how to interpret the common law and in particular a 
 
 5. See NEIL MACCORMICK, RHETORIC AND THE RULE OF LAW 208 (2005). 
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principle within the common law. An example is causation, on which 
an English common law decision could be based. So it is not that the 
Australian decision as such has any weight, but it illustrates a principle 
of the (shared) common law within a particular area from which an 
English rule could also be drawn. This is why common lawyers are 
some of the most regular users of comparative law, even if that 
comparison is within the common law family. European Union (“EU”) 
law does use the concept of “principles common to the constitutional 
traditions of Member States” and this, under article 308 of the 
European Community Treaty, serves as a basis for the creation of 
European Community law. But this concept suggests that there might 
be some principles of law that are shared between states. In my 
Australian example, the common law6 is a binding source of law, and 
so the appeal to a principle within that common law that is shared by a 
number of legal systems is an appeal in some sense to a binding source 
of law. In the EU example, the source is binding on the EU, but only 
on Member States when they are acting as EU courts. 
(c) The more interesting and difficult question is whether a legal rule 
of another jurisdiction can provide a justification where there is no 
express common rule that is shared with the receiving jurisdiction. An 
argument from France might be a curiosity in England—for example, 
on wrongful birth—but it does not formally add any weight to a 
solution reached by the application of English law. It may comfort the 
English judge that judges from other countries have reached the same 
solution, but does this help with the justification? It may clearly serve 
as a source of inspiration, but in what way does it provide a distinctive 
argument? 
 It is the third category of case that contains the interest for this 
Article. In the difficult cases, where a judge draws on the practice of 
another legal system to support a decision in his own, he is immediately 
met with the argument that the foreign law is not one of the sources of his 
own domestic legal system. It is, therefore, formally irrelevant. This Article 
discusses how he might make the foreign system relevant. 
 
 6. We can argue whether the common law binds through a notion of established caselaw or of 
general principles of law. See generally Robert Alexy et al., Precedent in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS 17, 30 (D. Neil MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 
1997) (describing observance of German precedent as obligatory); see generally Michel Troper & 
Christophe Grzegorczyk, Precedent in France, in INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS 103, 130 (D. Neil 
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997) (describing French precedents as not being binding 
themselves but rather as being illustrative of formally binding legal principles). Civilian courts often 
cite decisions of other jurisdictions for their persuasive power, which is close to the idea of a “common 
law” extending beyond specific national boundaries. 
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II. PRIVATE LAW AS A CONVERSATION BEYOND BOUNDARIES 
Private law offers a rich history of examples of one jurisdiction 
drawing on the law of another jurisdiction in developing its law. The 
European Legal Development project has examined the development of the 
law of tort in Europe from 1850 to 2000, in particular, liability for fault.7 
The argument in this Part is that, at least in private law, there is a regular 
conversation across national boundaries. Often, we examine the meaning of 
texts that may cross nations. But even where we are not examining a 
common text, the existence of common problems or tasks makes it not 
merely prudent or useful to find out what other countries do. Their 
experience is often a trigger for legal change. It is rare that we import the 
foreign solution, but we often revise our law in light of the results that 
foreign systems have been able to achieve. In another place, I have called 
this “cross-fertilization.”8 Essentially this means the change that occurs in a 
legal system integrates with the patterns of that system, so it looks like it 
belongs. In more formal terms, we maintain the importance of coherence as 
well as consistency within the legal system.9 
There is a danger that we think of legal systems as closed, limited by 
obedience to one political sovereign with a single set of legal professions 
and courts, with a united education and training system. This picture does 
not capture the interplay between legal systems. The institutional structure 
and influences between systems are much more complex and varied, 
leading to regular links. In the first section, I show that, at least within 
Europe, there are background conditions that make legal systems 
necessarily open to influences from other national legal systems. In the 
 
 7. The series includes seven volumes: COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE 
LAW OF TORTS (David Ibbetson & John Bell eds. 2010);THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY 
(Simon Whittaker ed., 2010) [hereinafter PRODUCT LIABILITY]; THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRAFFIC 
LIABILITY (Wolfgang Ernst ed., 2010) [hereinafter TRAFFIC LIABILITY]; THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
MEDICAL LIABILITY (Ewoud Hondius ed., 2010); THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY BETWEEN 
NEIGHBORS (James Gordley ed., 2010); THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIABILITY IN RELATION TO 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (Miquel Martín-Casals ed., 2010) hereinafter TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE]; 
THE DEVELOPMENT AND MAKING OF LEGAL DOCTRINE (Nils Jansen ed., 2010) [hereinafter LEGAL 
DOCTRINE]. 
 8. John Bell, Mechanisms for Cross-fertilisation of Administrative Law in Europe, in NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW 147 (Jack Beatson & Takis Tridimas eds., 1998) (defining 
“cross-fertilisation” as “an external stimulus promotes an evolution within the receiving legal system. 
The evolution involves an internal adaptation by the receiving legal system in its own way. The new 
development is a distinctive but organic product of that system rather than a bolt-on.”). 
 9. MACCORMICK, supra note 5, at 190, 193 (arguing that consistency is simply a matter of the 
lack of contradiction between legal provisions, but coherence “is a matter of their ‘making sense’ by 
being rationally related as a set, instrumentally or intrinsically, to the realization of some common value 
or values”). 
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second section and drawing on the European Legal Development project, I 
show an example of how legal ideas from the United States in relation to 
product liability shaped the development of civilian legal systems in 
Europe. 
A. Background Conditions 
There are three background features of legal systems which may 
explain why they are porous to ideas from other legal systems. First, there 
is no necessary reason to conceive of legal systems existing in isolation 
from each other. This is connected to the nature of the law. Private law is 
essentially about texts, rather than about the intention of the legislature. The 
reasons for this are obvious. In Europe, the boundaries of nation states have 
been fluid. Take the town of Tournai in Belgium. In 1787, it was part of the 
Austrian Empire and an Austrian version of Roman Law prevailed in 
private law. In 1795, it was part of the French Republic, and so it adopted 
the French Civil Code when it was enacted in 1804. In 1814, it was part of 
the Kingdom of the Netherlands, which also had the French Civil Code. In 
1830, it was part of the new Kingdom of Belgium. In 1914 and again in 
1940, it was occupied by Germany without the abolition of its Civil Code. 
Belgium has the French Civil Code of 1804 because of the occupation by 
the French, but since 1949 the Code has existed in two languages, French 
and the Flemish (Dutch) language. Since 1951, it has operated within the 
various forms of what is now the European Union. Belgian lawyers 
recognise the difficulty of looking just at the rules enacted by the Belgian 
legislator and the decisions of the Belgian courts.10 Countries like Germany 
and Italy did not exist as nation states before 1870. Their law schools have 
existed for many centuries and have interpreted private law, but the 
attachment to a nation state has not been crucial. 
Second and consequently, attachment to a document is more 
important, and that document is interpreted. So the French civil code of 
1804 applied in France, Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, parts of Italy and 
part of Germany at various times in the nineteenth century.11 Commentaries 
on that Code circulated widely. So the German-language commentary by 
Zacharias was used in southern Germany and its structure (and some of its 
 
 10. See BOUDEWIJN BOUCKAERT & MARK VAN HOECKE, INLEIDING TOT HET RECHT 19 (10th ed. 
1994). 
 11. See RICHTERLICHE ANWENDUNG DES CODE CIVIL IN SEINEN EUROPÄISCHEN 
GELTUNGSBEREICH AUSSERHALB FRANKREICHES (Barbara Dölemeyer, Heinz Mohnhaupt & 
Alessandro Somma eds., 2006). 
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ideas) were used by French writers when they wrote their own textbooks.12 
Belgian and Luxembourgeois interpretations of the same civil code were 
then cited in French courts. Common texts create the community and the 
tradition of interpretation.13 The result is that commentaries produced in 
one country are being read in others.14 A particular feature of this 
conversation between legal systems over the same texts is the importance 
of translations and thus the accessibility of these ideas.15 The existence of 
translations shows a ready market for foreign ideas, which is not confined 
to countries sharing the same legal tradition. 
This history of European territories and the conversation about the 
interpretation of texts have an important impact on how the law is 
conceived. It is first and foremost a tradition within which particular texts 
have pride of place. They are then interpreted and re-interpreted over time. 
Only secondarily is the law the will of the enacting legislator.16 After all, 
the law of any state is made up of provisions enacted by a wide variety of 
legislators—monarchs, dictators, democracies and lots of others in 
between. If you look at the references in private law textbooks, you get no 
hint that a law enacted by the Nazis or a decision of the courts under Nazi 
rule might not be still good private law. That is why I have argued like so 
many Europeans that we take a contemporaneous view of the interpretation 
of the law, rather than a historical one.17 
Take for example a current commentary on the German Civil Code 
(legislation of 1896, coming into force in 1900, which was during the 
Empire): 
[Der Gläubiger] haftet also für den vom Eigentümer erlittenen 
Rechtsverlust, sofern ihn an der Pfändung und Verwertung einer 
schuldnerfremden Sachen ein Verschulden trifft. 
 
 12. See CHARLES AUBRY & CHARLES RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS D’APRÈS LA 
MÉTHODE DE ZACHARIAE (4th ed. 1869). 
 13. On the notion of tradition, see generally Mark Krygier, Law as Tradition, 5 LAW & PHIL. 237, 
237-62 (1986). 
 14. See GUIDO ALPA, TRADITION AND EUROPEANIZATION IN ITALIAN LAW 34-51 (2005). See also 
David Ibbetson, English Law and the European Ius Commune 1450-1650, 1 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. 
LEGAL STUD. 115 (2006) (relating to the earlier period). 
 15. See GUIDO ALPA, THE AGE OF REBUILDING 375-76 (2007) (noting that over 1000 legal works 
were translated from French into Italian in the nineteenth century, with about half that number 
translated from German and about 160 English works). 
 16. Cf. JOHN BELL & GEORGE ENGLE, CROSS STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 23-30 (3d ed. 1995). 
 17. John Bell, Interpreting Statutes over Time, in TEMPS ET DROIT, LE DROIT A-T-IL POUR 
VOCATION DE DURER? 31-53 (François Ost & Mark Van Hoecke eds., 1998). 
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[The debtor is therefore liable for the deterioration in rights suffered by 
the owner of property, insofar as that wrongfully affects the pledging 
and the value of things external to the creditor]. 
Set side by side in the footnotes, we have cases from all kinds of 
regimes being cited as evidence of what the current law is.18 These 
references are to German Supreme Court (Reichsgericht/Bundesgerichtshof 
(“BGB”)) decisions from all the regimes since 1900, including Nazi 
Germany. The law is a set of texts that have to be interpreted. (In that 
respect, it is rather like Scripture, as Gadamer points out.19) German 
lawyers interpret those texts in the light of the current constitution, 
membership of the European Union and the values expressed in 
contemporary principles of private law.20 
The common law is a similar system. English lawyers cheerfully cite 
Australian, Canadian, Irish and New York cases to support an argument 
about the law of tort. It does not bother us whether there have been 
constitutional differences or whether the rules were created at different 
periods. Our concern is to find the principles that now represent the 
common law. 
Third, the movement of ideas is not limited to national boundaries 
because academics (and judges) are intellectual scavengers. Individuals are 
mobile and visit or communicate with colleagues abroad. National law is a 
latecomer to the Academy. In France, it dates from 1689 (and not really 
until 1807). In England, the first course was in 1753 and the real start of 
teaching English law in the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge is after 
1871.21 In Germany, Thomasius was giving lectures on German law in the 
University of Halle in 1705 and Beyer in Wittenberg in 1707,22 but it was 
much more legal history than the science of contemporary law. Creating 
local German civil laws was a work started in the mid-eighteenth century,23 
but it took a while. Legal education revolved in Germany and England for 
 
 18. Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen [RGZ] 61, 430, 432 (1905, during the 
German Empire); RGZ 108 (260, 263) (1924, during the Weimar Republic); RGZ 156 (395,400) (1938, 
during Hitler’s Third Reich); Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 58 (207, 
210) (1972, German Federal Republic (West Germany)); [BGHZ] 118 (201, 205ff) (1992, German 
Federal Republic (Unified Germany): Taken from Gerhard Wagner, in 5 MÜNCHNER KOMMENTAR ZUM 
BÜRGERLICHEN GESETZBUCH §823at 1788, para. 108 n.430 (5th ed., Mathias Habersack ed. 2009). 
 19. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 294-95 (1975). 
 20. See, e.g., BASIL S. MARKESINSIS & HANNES UNBERATH, THE GERMAN LAW OF TORTS, 415–
420 (4th ed. 2002) (discussing the Herrenreiter decision). 
 21. See R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, JUDGES, LEGISLATORS AND PROFESSORS 61–63 (1987). 
 22. See RICHARD SCHRÖDER, LEHRBUCH DER DEUTSCHEN RECHSTGESCHICHTE 904 (4th ed. 
1902). 
 23. Id. at 910–12. 
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many years around Roman law. So there was no need to restrict interest to 
what emanated from national courts or legislatures. Equally, there was no 
necessary restriction on individuals and where they worked. John Austin, 
the first professor of jurisprudence in the University of London found that 
few people were coming to his lectures, so he went off to Heidelberg for 
much of the rest of his life.24 Leading works of the period display an 
erudite knowledge of the laws of other European systems. Dicey was proud 
to write about the strengths of the British constitution. But that did not 
prevent him from citing Gneist, Duguit, de Toqueville and Montesquieu, as 
well as discussing the Swiss and US constitutions.25 Simpson points out 
that the French civil code was cited more than 40 times in English cases up 
to 1850. In tort, we have a great awareness of solutions in different 
countries. The most obvious examples are Pollock and Winfield; Pollock’s 
view of the law of torts was shaped greatly by his stay in Harvard.26 
Winfield looked to U.S. caselaw in the 1920s, confirmed by visits he made. 
These visits led to articles in English and American journals that paved the 
way for the leading decision of Donoghue v. Stevenson in 1932.27 
B. Illustration of Legal Developments: Products 
I want to take two stories from the book on product liability in the 
European Legal Development series.28 Our two correspondents, Coggiola 
and Wagner, give us accounts of the place of two individuals in the 
development of product liability in Italy and Germany. The problem is how 
the end-user of a product could claim compensation for personal injuries 
suffered as a result of defects in the product. 
The research for our project relating to products shows how legal 
ideas travel. With the move from an agricultural economy to an industrial 
economy, two changes occur. The first is that products become more 
complex, so caveat emptor is less appropriate: the buyer is really not in a 
position to assess a product by visual inspection. The second is that the 
distribution chain changes. Instead of the buyer relying on a local seller and 
his expertise, the manufacturer produces standardised products and markets 
 
 24. See WILLIAM L. MORISON, JOHN AUSTIN (1982). 
 25. See ALBERT V. DICEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONSTITUTION 183–205 (10th ed. 
1959) (1915). 
 26. See e.g., NEIL DUXBURY, FREDERICK POLLOCK AND THE ENGLISH JURISTIC TRADITION 224–
48 (2004); LEGAL DOCTRINE, supra note 7, at 49 n. 21; Percy H. Winfield, Duty in Tortious Negligence, 
34 COLUM. L. REV. 41 (1934). 
 27. See Alan Rodger, Lord Macmillan's Speech in Donoghue v. Stevenson, 108 L. Q. REV. 236 
(1993). 
 28. See generally PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra note 7. 
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them directly to the public. There is little distinctive contribution from the 
retailer-distributor. The legal options are either that the victim sues for a 
breach of warranty in the sales contract or brings a tort/delict action. 
The sorts of complex products being bought in the second half of the 
nineteeth century were generally industrial machinery, the victims of which 
were typically employees. Workmens’ Compensation, introduced in 
Germany in 1884 and spreading across Europe by 1910, provided a non-
tortious solution for injuries caused by machines.29 The next complex 
product was the motor car. This product was bought initially by rich 
consumers and later by the wider public. Accidents were frequent. In 
Germany in 1909, there was one accident causing death or personal injury 
for every seven vehicles on the road.30 In France in 1925, the Cour de 
cassation reacted by creating strict liability in contract on the part of a 
professional seller who was liable for all losses if the product had a hidden 
defect.31 Coupled with lax rules of privity, this provided a basis of liability 
for consumers, even if they were not the purchaser of products. Particularly 
because of the influence of an article written by a Parisian professor, 
Mazeaud, in 1955,32 the fiction developed that the professional seller was 
deemed to be in bad faith. There was a short time limit within which a 
claim for breach of warranty could be brought under article 1641 of the 
French Civil Code. A more contested solution was to use strict liability for 
things. Having found its own solution, France became rather immune from 
later developments. There were problems with Ford cars manufactured in 
Germany in the 1930s owing to defects in the brakes which Ford knew 
about. In 1940, the German Supreme Court held Ford liable for intentional 
delict under §826 BGB.33 In the 1920s, English lawyers retained fault 
liability for defective brakes, rather than the tort of breach of a statutory 
duty.34 After World War II and the subsequent austerity period ended, the 
consumer society was reborn with a much greater variety of manufactured 
products.35 
 
 29. French law had adapted its private law and administrative law liability rules to create a form of 
strict liability in 1895-96, shortly before workmen’s compensation was introduced. In English law, the 
tort of breach of a statutory duty performed a similar role. See Groves v. Lord Wimborne [1898] 2 Q.B. 
402 (Eng.). 
 30. See TRAFFIC LIABILITY, supra note 7, at 93 n.66. 
 31. Cour de cassation [Cass.] req. 21, Oct. 20, 1925, D.P. 1925, 1.9, obs. Célice, (France). 
 32. See PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra note 7, at 91. 
 33. Id.at 120: RGZ 163 (21, 25) (Ger.); RG Deutsches Recht 1940, 1293 (Ger.). 
 34. TRAFFIC LIABILITY, supra note 7, at 40–41; Phillips v. British Hygienic Laundry [1923] 2 
K.B. at 832 (Eng.). 
 35. See PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra note 7, at 46. 
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In the early part of the twentieth century, Italian courts were very 
protective of newly emerging industries. Italian scholars were naturally 
outward-looking. There had been an official attempt to have a new joint 
Civil Code with the French in 1928. Subsequently, an official Italian 
commission produced a modern civil code, which was later enacted in 1942 
and is still in force.36 That was heavily influenced by German 
developments including their civil code of 1900. In such a context, it was 
not surprising that leading Italian scholars, such as Gorla in 1937, studying 
at product liability should look at French solutions as a model. In France, 
the modern solution was to use strict contractual liability on the part of the 
professional seller under the warranty against hidden defects. Such a 
liability could apply not only to the purchaser, but also to the ultimate user, 
mainly by some ingenious re-interpretation of the rules on privity of 
contract. Gorla represented this tendency in 1937 and showed how it could 
apply in Italian law.37 The problem remained firmly labelled as a problem 
of “sales,” not a problem of product liability. He developed his argument 
after World War II, as French doctrinal writing and caselaw expanded.38 
But, while French law was a natural reference point, it had to be 
acknowledged that French law was out of line with the tradition of Roman 
law in which Italian law stood and was stretching the Code by ingenious 
fictions—treating all professional sellers in bad faith and interpreting “costs 
incurred in the sale” as including any kind of loss. There was also the 
problem of stretching privity of contract. It is here that Gorla’s newly 
discovered reference point, the United States, came in. He was in the 
United States in 1949-50, just as Justice Traynor’s early decisions on 
products were being discussed.39 To begin with, he started to borrow the 
American conceptualization of the problem, using a social category, 
“product liability,” rather than a legal category, “sales.” In addition, from 
the American experience, he saw an alternative legal route to compensation 
for the victim of defective products to the law on sales. It was also clear 
that Gorla had read the work of Prosser, which was to lead to the Second 
 
 36. GUIDO ALPA, LA CULTURA DELLE, 260 and 304ff (2000). 
 37. See Nadia Coggiola, The Development of Product Liability in Italy, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra note 28, 197–98 (citing GINO GORLA, LA COMPRAVENDITA, nos 121, 170 
(1937) (suggesting that the discussion on the issue is actually extremely brief, as it was of marginal 
interest in the overall scheme of his work). 
 38. Id. at 213–14 (citing articles by Gino Gorla from 1957 and 1959). 
 39. In particular, Escola v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal 2d 453 (1944); Greenman v. Yuba 
Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57 (1963); William L. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict 
Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1132 (1960) (collecting cases); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §402A (1965); G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL 
HISTORY 197–207 (Expanded ed. 2003). 
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restatement text of §402A published in 1965.40 The idea of strict liability 
through reversing the burden of proof in fault liability actions under art. 
2043 of the Italian Civil Code of 1942 offered an alternative.41 That came 
through in a decision in 1964, Saiwa.42 The case concerned personal injury 
caused to consumers through defective biscuits. The Italian Supreme Court 
(Corte di cassazione) rejected the argument of the manufacturer that the 
consumer had to prove it had been at fault. It is clear from Martorano’s 
commentary on the case43 that discussions in Germany and the United 
States were well known, especially through the work of Gino Gorla in 
195944 and Werner Lorenz’s seminal article in 1961.45 There is also 
discussion of insurance being taken out by manufacturers to deal with this 
liability.46 So the foreign material provides a context, especially for 
academic writers, but would clearly have been known to the Court.47 The 
importance of American law was to take on board both problem-based 
classification and a greater emphasis on the role of law in social 
engineering. The specific solution to which a transplant of Prosser’s ideas 
would have led was strict liability. That was not doctrinally possible in 
Italy, despite the urgings of many authors, like Gorla.48 Instead the Court in 
Saiwa49 adopted a presumption of liability, which the manufacturer found it 
hard to discharge. 
In our collection, Wagner makes similar points about Germany. There 
is one pivotal author for the development of product liability, Werner 
 
 40. See WHITE, supra note 39, at 169–72. WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS (1955). 
 41. See Coggiola, supra note 37, at 209. 
 42. Cass., sez III, 25 May 1964, n.1270, reprinted in 88 FORO ITALIANO: RACCOLTA GENERALE 
DI GIURISPRUDENZA, at 2098 (1965), commented on by Frederico Martorano, Sulla responsabilità del 
fabbricante per la messa in commercio di prodotti dannosi (a proposito di una sentenza della 
Cassazione) in 89 FORO ITALIANO: RACCOLTA GENERALE DI GIURISPRUDENZA 13 (1966). 
 43. Martorano, supra note 42, at 15-17. 
 44. Gino Gorla, Considerazioni sulla giurisprudenza francese in tema di garanzia per i vizi 
redibitori, in STUDI IN ONORE DI FRANCESCO MESSINEO 231 (A. Scialoja ed., 1959). 
 45. Werner Lorenz, Produkthaftung, in FESTSCHRIFT DER RECHTS- UND 
STAATSWISSENSCHAFTLICHEN FAKULTÄT DER JULIUS-MAXIMILIANS-UNIVERSITÄT WŰRZBURG ZUM 
75. GEBURTSTAG VON HERMANN NOTTARP , 591 (P. Mikat ed., 1961). 
 46. Martorano, supra note 42, at 16 n.16 (citing M. De Martino, Prospettive nuove di una formula 
di copertura in evoluzione: l’assicurazione della responsabilità civile prodotti, in 61 DIRITTO E 
PRATICA DI ASSICURAZIONE (1964)). 
 47. See id. at 16. 
 48. See Coggiola, supra note 37, at 213-15. 
 49. Cass., sez III, 25 May 1964, n. 1270, reprinted in 88 FORO ITALIANO: RACCOLTA GENERALE 
DI GIURISPRUDENZA, at 2098 (1965). 
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Lorenz. He won a scholarship to spend time in England and was familiar 
with the works of Prosser and Gorla. Wagner writes50 
With a little exaggeration, one might say that product liability was 
imported from the US, both with regard to the legal problem and its 
solution. The question as to why American law figured so prominently 
here is difficult to answer. One factor might have been the emigration 
of eminent German lawyers—mostly of Jewish faith—to the US, 
which made it easier for German [language scholars] to access the 
learning of American law. Throughout the 1960s, a relatively high 
number of German-born professors continued to teach at leading 
American law schools, and they were happy to introduce scholars from 
post-war Germany to American legal thought. In addition, the German 
and the US governments facilitated scholarly exchange across the 
Atlantic, both financially and politically, in order to help re-educate 
German lawyers. 
Like Herbert Bernstein at Duke, Rudolf Schlesinger of Cornell was 
such a German-born professor teaching at an American law school.51 He 
invited Gorla and Lorenz to work on projects with him. Lorenz’s ideas 
formed part of an active debate on whether contract or delict (torts) should 
be the basis of liability. This was resolved by the BGH in its “Fowlpest” or 
“Newcastle Disease” decision of 1968.52 Lorenz’s views that one should 
create a direct liability based on reliance were not accepted. They were too 
far from existing legal techniques.53 But the court did come to a similar 
result by creating a presumption of fault based on the damage occurring 
within the sphere of control of the manufacturer.54 The manufacturer found 
it in practice difficult to discharge the burden of proof imposed. Lorenz 
then went to be an expert for the Council of Europe project on product 
liability, which gave rise to the Directive.55 
 
 50. Gerhard Wagner, The Development of Product Liability in Germany, in PRODUCT LIABILITY, 
supra note 7, at 121. 
 51. For information on the importance of émigré scholars for comparative law generally, see Jack 
Beatson, Aliens, Enemy Aliens, and Friendly Enemy Aliens: Britain as a Home for Émigré Lawyers, in 
JURISTS UPROOTED, 73, 87 (Jack Beatson & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2004) (stating that 132 of the 
1200 university teachers dismissed by the Nazi Government in 1933 were law teachers, and that there 
were 113 refugee lawyers and 102 law students registered in Britain in 1933). 
 52. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH][Federal Court of Justice] Nov. 26, 1968, 51 Entscheidungen des 
Bundesgerichtshofes in Zivilsachen [BGHZ] 91 (93ff) (Ger.), translated in CASES, MATERIALS AND 
TEXT ON NATIONAL, SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW 601 (Walter van Gerven et al. 
eds., 2000) [hereinafter SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW]. 
 53. See SUPRANATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TORT LAW, supra note 52, at 99. 
 54. Id. at 93-101. 
 55. Council Directive 1985/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of laws, regulations 
and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products. OJ L 
210, 7 August 1985. Council of Europe, Council Directive, On the Approximation of the Laws, 
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These two stories illustrate three points: (1) legal development 
depends on people, as much as on ideas; (2) legal development frequently 
does not involve borrowing something from another legal system, but being 
inspired to create an indigenous rule or principle (i.e. development results 
from cross-fertilisation); and (3) the extent of foreign influence depends on 
how it is presented and the climate of the receiving legal community. 
(1)These two stories merely illustrate that the circulation of ideas 
depends on people. Legal development is not often the result of systematic 
activity. People with their own personal histories and reasons for travel or 
communication become vectors for the transmission of legal ideas. This is 
particularly the case where you need to translate the ideas into another 
language or into another legal culture. But the two stories show that 
individual histories relate to a broader climate in their legal community and 
in their society. The choice of potential comparisons (France or the United 
States) fit what others in their community saw as relevant and exciting. 
Their compatriots were ready to listen to what they brought back from 
those countries. In the case of liability for products, there was also a sense 
that the United States (and to some extent France) represented societies that 
were more advanced economically and from which lessons could be 
learned. 
(2) But, of course, the mere publication or transmission of information 
about other legal systems does not lead inevitably to any legal change. In 
order to achieve change, there need to be decisions, often strategic 
decisions, by those in power (courts or legislators). The circulation of ideas 
by academics merely provides the basic material from which decisions can 
be selected. Neither Gorla’s views, influenced by French law and by 
American law, nor Lorenz’s theory of strict liability, influenced by 
American law, were accepted by their national courts. But this did not 
mean that they were unsuccessful. The extent of the discussion in the BGH 
shows that these were views that had to be taken seriously and could not be 
dismissed as some exotic foreign invention of no relevance to Germany. 
Just before the BGH decision in the Fowlpest case, the German annual 
conference of law scholars (the Juristentag) had been given over to the 
question of product liability.56 So Lorenz’s contribution was shaping a 
much larger debate. The same is true of Gorla’s contribution, which 
sparked a range of contributions noted in the commentary on the Saiwa 
case.57 Perhaps the most important part of the contribution is not the 
 
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective 
Products, 1985/374/EEC (Jul. 25, 1985). 
 56. Wagner, supra note 50, at 122 n.20. 
 57. See Martorano, supra note 42. 
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particular opinion that each academic author proposed, but the way in 
which each contributed significantly to changing the frame of reference for 
academic and judicial debate. In particular, they managed to make 
American common law a legitimate point of reference for legal 
interpretation within civil law systems. 
(3) The effectiveness of this approach depended on how the American 
system was presented. Guido Alpa makes the point that, in the nineteenth 
century, there were many translations of works on English law by leading 
writers.58 But this did not lead to any influence from the common law on 
Italian private law. The reason he suggests is that those English authors 
who were translated generally criticized English law as archaic and 
unsystematic. If national lawyers were not enthusiastic about the merits of 
their own system, why should foreign lawyers take it seriously?59 This was 
in contrast to the enthusiasm expressed by many of the same authors for the 
British constitution, and that enthusiasm was influential. American authors 
such as Prosser were enthusiastic about the development of product 
liability and this was infectious. The second aspect is the way the ideas are 
received. Here the arguments of the American lawyers engaged with the 
period mood in European countries. Economic progress after the dark days 
of war was highlighted in the consumer revolution. America had been 
further ahead in the 1930s and was very much ahead in the 1950s. Product 
liability fit into emerging social and economic changes arising from 
changes in the modes of production and distribution of goods. Alpa notes 
that it is not surprising that “consumerism” as a legal idea starts in America 
and then spread to Italy, among other European countries.60Although there 
was some recognition of the category of “consumer” in the preparatory 
documents for the Italian Civil Code in 1941, significant legal discussion of 
consumer rights took place in the 1970s, following on from the consumer 
boom in the Italian economy of the 1960s.61 The law on product liability 
was characterised as modernizing German or Italian or European law to 
deal with a new problem. The paradigm of modernization fit the Zeitgeist. 
The alternative paradigm was the paradigm of fidelity to tradition, to 
doctrinal consistency. Although the courts actually negotiated changes 
between these two paradigms, the significance of what Gorla and Lorenz 
achieved was really to push the legal debate into a new dominant paradigm 
in this area. 
 
 58. See Alpa, supra note 15, at 376. 
 59. Id. at 380-81. But cf. id. at 392-93 (describing Gorla’s willingness to embrace Pollock’s 
justification for the bindingness of contract in consideration). 
 60. Id. at 201-02. 
 61. Id. at 200, 202-3, 203 n.9. 
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So, in terms of content, the influence of the United States encouraged 
the creation of the liability of manufacturers for products. But the Italians 
did not parallel the American method of strict liability in tort but they 
reconsidered their own law to find analogous routes by a presumption of 
liability under artice 2043 of the Italian Civil Code. 
C. Comparative Law and the Legislator 
Legislation is often adopted not necessarily in order to deal with a 
pressing domestic social problem, but as much for symbolic reasons. The 
national legislation can appear modern. In Spain, industrialization had 
come late, and only a very small proportion of the workforce was engaged 
in industry. Workmen’s compensation was not the pressing social problem 
that it was elsewhere. But the Spanish legislature regarded workmen’s 
compensation legislation as a badge of modernity and forward thinking; it 
did not matter that only a very small number of people could benefit from 
it.62 
Legal change is the product of many factors. But an important part of 
the process of reviewing the law usually involves an examination of what 
other countries are doing. A first reason may be the comparison of different 
experiences and outcomes: a way of checking whether systems that have 
broadly similar problems are achieving similar kinds of outcome. The 
second use might be to look for advanced systems and put the law in an 
advanced position. The third reason might be to anticipate the future. 
In the United Kingdom, the national law commissions will typically 
undertake research on how the law is being developed in other countries 
(for example, privity of contract). In relation to product liability, the subject 
formed part of a wide-ranging Royal Commission on Civil Liability,63 
which did look at foreign jurisdictions. The principle of selection is 
obviously relevance: so common law countries tend to be preferred, though 
civil law systems are also the object of study. The legislator will choose not 
only on the basis of systemic compatibility, but also on the reputation of 
another system for being progressive. European-wide legislation is 
preferred because it ensures that there are no competitive disadvantages. 
This was certainly the case in Italy. 
The legislature will undertake a certain amount of horizon scanning. 
Within Europe, no country was big enough to have a complete picture of 
 
 62. See Miquel Martín-Casals & Jordi Ribot, Technological Change and the Development of 
Liability for Fault in Spain, in TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, supra note 7, at 227, 238-244. 
 63. See generally Royal Commission on Civil Liability and Compensation for Personal Injury, 
1977-78, Cmnd. 7054; see Peter Bartrip, No-Fault Compensation on the Roads in Twentieth Century 
Britain, 69 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 263, 274-81 (2010). 
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the problems and solutions. It is here that the more advanced countries play 
a significant role. In order to predict problems, it is easier to examine the 
experience of other systems. A classic example was Prussia in 1838. It 
introduced legislation on compensation for railway accidents merely four 
days after the first passenger line was opened. The Prussian King had seen 
the accidents in England64 and wanted to ensure that provision was made. 
In relation to products, Spain developed rules in the light of German and 
American experiences. 
But we noted in the project that comparative law examples provide the 
raw material for legislative reform. The actual trigger for legislative action 
is likely to be a crisis. This is most clearly seen in relation to Spain, where 
specific legislation was enacted immediately following the Colza oil 
scandal.65 In May 1981 a mass poisoning resulted from the consumption of 
denaturalized colza oil. This process was required by Spanish law in order 
to prevent certain imported oils from reaching the consumer market. When 
the product reached the consumers, thousands of people were affected. The 
scandal led to legislation protecting consumers in 1984 and to judicial 
decisions in 1990.66 Whittaker comments: “one is left with the impression 
of a set of legislative provisions put together under political pressure in too 
much haste, and without full thought being given to their technical or 
practical implications.”67 The Thalidomide case was another example 
where legislative investigation was triggered by an accident.68 In such 
situations, the legislator draws on what is already available by way of 
preparation, because the imperative to legislate in response to public 
opinion often outstrips the capacity for rational deliberation. 
Of course, in addition, national governments form part of a wider 
community of ideas. The development of product liability in Europe shows 
this. In his introduction to The Development of Product Liability, Whittaker 
explains that the basic ideas of current product liability were developed by 
the Council of Europe over a number of years. 69 That, in turn, was inspired 
by the U.S. experience of product liability. There was a deliberate attempt 
not to go down the U.S. route. So there was a sense of differentiation. The 
Council of Europe drafted a Convention on product liability whose 
 
 64. Sebastian Lohsse, The Development of Traffic Liability in Germany, in, supra note 30, at 81. 
 65. Miquel Martín-Casals & Josep Solé Feliu, The Development of Product Liability in Spain, in 
PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra note 7, at 251-256. 
 66. Id. at 246-47. 
 67. Simon Whittaker, Introduction to Fault in Product Liability, in PRODUCT LIABILITY, supra 
note 7, at 22. 
 68. Id. at 6. 
 69. Id. at 22-23. 
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contents were discussed between 1971 and 1977.70  The process was 
essentially technical, being discussed and agreed by a committee of 
experts, and its adoption by Member States was entirely voluntary.  Its 
explicit concern was with the protection of consumers, understood to mean 
any person physically injured or killed by a product. Its principal 
provisions were clearly directly inspired by American law, most notably its 
definition of “defect” in terms of “the safety which a person is entitled to 
expect, having regard to all the circumstances.”71 This standard of liability 
was seen as a “mixed system,” imposing neither an “absolute liability” nor 
merely a presumption of fault.72  While the Convention never came into 
force, its provisions were important as they formed the blueprint for the 
European Economic Community (“EEC”) Commission in its proposals for 
a directive governing liability for defective products to be enacted by the 
Council. Both Italian and German chapters in the The Development of 
Product Liability note how their national laws were changed by the 1985 
Directive.73 The change in Italy was more marked than in Germany, since 
the Germans had developed their own sophisticated case-law interpreting 
§823 BGB in favour of consumers following the Fowlpest decision.74 
D. Non-legislators 
In relation to product liability, there was cross-national discussion by 
the potential litigants and their insurers. This reflects the importance from 
the nineteenth century of the growth in transnational interest groups.75 
Perhaps the clearest examples come in relation to industrialization. Trade 
associations existed in France, Italy and England. Their function was to 
support their members by spreading good practice and conducting 
inspections. Such industrial self-help was also supported by insurance 
companies. They either conducted their own inspections or insisted on the 
inspection. So the British Manchester Steam Users’ Association was 
founded in 1854. French and Italian associations followed.76 There was 
exchange between these associations. Regarding motor cars, there was an 
early meeting in Paris of the International Association of Motoring in 1909 
 
 70. European Convention on Products Liability in Regard to Personal Injury and Death, Jan. 27, 
1977, E.T.S. No. 91. 
 71. Id.at art. 2(c). 
 72. Whittaker, supra note 67, at 23 (citing Explanatory Report to the European Convention on 
Product Liability in Regard to Personal Injury and Death, E.T.S. No. 91, ¶ 17 (Jan. 27, 1977)). 
 73. See Wagner, supra note 50, at 133-38,218-22; see also Nadia Coggiola, supra note 37, at 218-
22. 
 74. See supra note 52. 
 75. MATTHEW HILTON, CONSUMERISM IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY BRITAIN 301 (2003). 
 76. Martín-Casals & Ribot, supra note 62, at 60-61, 116, 207-08. 
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which showed the extent of interchange at this early stage. In relation to 
products, the Spanish chapter gives a graphic example: 
[I]t was in the decade of the 1970s when public authorities and private 
companies started to worry about the possibility of taking out liability 
insurance for defective products (seguro de la responsabilidad civil 
por productos). As a result of this concern, in October 1970, a seminar 
dealing with tortious liability of companies, professional liability and 
product liability was organised in Madrid under the auspices of Swiss 
Re. According to Professor Rojo Fernández-Rio, the Spanish 
experience in this area is parallel to the experience in other countries, 
something that is shown by the fact that, in 1970, the European 
Insurance Committee (CEA) also expressed, in its plenary assembly, 
the concern of European insurance companies regarding coverage, as a 
new risk, of product liability of producers. In Spain one of the first 
scholarly studies on product liability insurance policies was published 
in 1972, at a time when these policies were not yet sold in Spain.77 
Insurance companies, too, engaged in sharing across jurisdictions. For 
example, there was a lot of insurance undertaken in the United States by 
European insurers as the U.S. economy developed.78 
From these examples, we have seen that academics, legislators and 
users of the law do not confine their attention to national boundaries. 
Problems are not confined to those boundaries and are often neither texts 
nor principles. 
Academic study abroad is not a new phenomenon. The twentieth 
century has made it more possible. In a number of areas, there is clear 
evidence of the movement of ideas. It is clear that there has been extensive 
reading of the legal materials of other countries. The area of product 
liability, for example, demonstrates wide reading, particularly by 
academics, of the developments in other countries.79 The development of 
legal rules often reflects ideas that were prominent among jurists. Gorla’s 
critique of Italian law on liability for products was then taken up by the 
 
 77. Martín-Casals & Feliu, supra note 65, at 264 (citations omitted). 
 78. Mathias Leimgruber, Accidental Crossings: Commercial Insurers and the Spread of 
Workmen’s Compensation in Western Europe and the United States, 1880-1930 15-17 (Mar. 22, 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 79. Coggiola, supra note 37, at 213-14 remarks on the way Gino Gorla in the 1950s examined 
French solutions, as well as English and American solutions, even if he did not recommend their 
wholesale adoption in Italy. The reversal of the burden of proof in Spanish car accident cases came in 
1943, after there had been much pressure in the literature to create no-fault liability, influenced by 
discussion of French, German and Italian laws. Miquel Martín-Casals & Albert Ruda, The Development 
of Legal Doctrine on Fault in Spanish Tort Law, in LEGAL DOCTRINE, supra note 7, at 201. 
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courts. More specifically, one can see reference to ideas of jurists being 
used by judges to justify their decisions.80 
Academics often play more than one role. Academics across all of the 
jurisdictions often became law reformers, judges, and politicians. By way 
of illustration, José Castán went from a professorship at Murcia to the 
Supreme Court; Robert Badinter was a professor at Paris and, at the same 
time, Minister of Justice, in which latter capacity he implemented proposals 
for an automobile accident scheme. Percy Winfield and W.T. Stallybrass 
were, respectively, professors in Cambridge and Oxford, who were 
specially appointed to the Law Reform Committee. Such scholars, and 
others like them, are not unusual. They do not just publish and hope that 
they will be noticed, but have the means of making their voices heard. 
Their later appointments put them in an excellent position to implement the 
ideas they had developed in their academic careers. 
III. STATUS OF FOREIGN LEGAL ARGUMENTS 
A. Argumentative Status 
Legal decisions do not typically depend on a single argument, but on 
an accumulation of arguments.81 Even when faced with a binding statute or 
precedent, the existence of other principles or rules may shape how that 
single rule is interpreted. The model of legal reasoning I have in mind is 
one that depends thus on a combination of reasons, each of which may be 
insufficient to justify the decision in its own right, but, taken together, they 
provide support for the decision.82 In other words, I would not look for a 
single binding and thus exclusionary reason to justify a decision. Binding 
reasons are not the only reasons. But it will be a matter of weighing the 
combinations of reasons pulling in each direction. Within this model, there 
is scope for a variety of reasons of different strength to contribute to a 
justification. As a result, it is of limited value to look at individual reasons 
such as foreign legal arguments on their own. The best analogy is with 
threads making a rope. One thread is unlikely to hold up the weight. But 
twisted in combination with other threads, it forms a cord which can carry a 
substantial weight. Common lawyers are bewitched by the force of a single 
binding precedent and often forget that precedents come in groups which 
provide a context for each other. The meaning of a precedent is not just 
 
 80. See Mercier, Cass. Civ., 20 May 1936, D.P. 1936.1.88 at 94 (conclusions of Advocat Général 
Matter quoting the academic writings of the reporter judge Josserand). 
 81. Cf. MACCORMICK, supra note 5, at 192-93. 
 82. J. Wisdom, Gods, 45 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 185 (1944); 
MACCORMICK, supra note 5, at 213. 
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given by the facts of the case, but also by the legal context out of which the 
ruling comes. After all, the concept of distinguishing (which limits the 
effect of a precedent) relies on the idea that any statement of the law also 
contains a number of unexpressed ideas, which are then articulated in a 
later case. The German expression ständige Rechtssprechung and the 
French idea of la jurisprudence constante both contain the idea that, while 
a single decision may not have a lot of force, a group of decisions in the 
same direction have a gravitational effect. 
To my mind, the most important combination is the way in which the 
argument from a foreign legal system adds luster to an argument already 
available in the host legal system. This is because I believe the mechanism 
by which a foreign legal idea takes root in the host legal system is 
essentially by means of the mechanism of “cross-fertilization.”83 Through 
this form of influence, we obtain an indigenous reason for a decision that 
integrates well within the host legal order. The foreign legal arguments 
may shape the debate and cast some possible solutions in a better light. But 
typically there is no wholesale direct transplanting of the solution from 
another system, unless it also integrates with a local solution. 
This is seen by the Italian and German cases, where the national 
arguments remained preponderant. The illustrations in the second section 
show that legal development is going to occur through a process of cross-
fertilization. That involves looking at what others do and coming to a way 
of developing your own law which is both consistent internally and 
coherent with the objectives that have been identified externally. The 
foreign material adds luster to the national solution. But we start with the 
national or code-based set of principles and then seek to apply them to the 
problems we have before us. Foreign materials help us to explore solutions 
that are out of the box. The problem that Gorla and Lorenz faced was that 
their use of American or French material did meet the “threshold of fit” (to 
use Dworkin’s term84) to satisfy the argument of internal consistency. 
Rather than adopt a direct strict liability between manufacturer and 
consumer, the courts adopted presumptions of fault. In broad terms it 
achieved the same result, but was more consistent with the existing law. 
Seen in this way, the foreign law reference adds strength to an existing 
domestic law argument. The foreign law adds attractiveness because it 
meets certain ideals of the domestic law. The Italian and German cases 
both highlighted the importance of legal solutions integrating with 
 
 83. See generally Bell, supra note 17. 
 84. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 255 (1986). 
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domestic legal concepts but also with the ambitions of society to be 
modern. 
The attractiveness of the American solution was that it had the 
authority of experience and modernity. It relies heavily on the idea of 
reputation. Catherine Dupré has picked this up in relation to the use of 
German constitutional court decisions in the development of Hungarian 
constitutional law.85 For various reasons, which she explains, the German 
court enjoyed a particularly high prestige in the eyes of Hungarian lawyers, 
and therefore provided an important reference point when they were 
developing their law.86 The importance of reputation for modernity and for 
experience with the problems was important for the American case. 
The reputation of a legal system depends on three factors. Prestige is 
only one of them. There also needs to be a sense that the foreign system is 
relevant. To go back to Dupré, Germany had managed to overcome the 
problems of dictatorship and had developed a strong protection for human 
rights. These were obviously relevant features for Hungary as it emerged 
from communism. Similarly, the fact that the United States was in the 
vanguard of the consumer economy and consumer society made it a 
relevant reference point for Germany and Italy, as well as the European 
Communities. 
The third factor that determines reputation is the proximity of the 
foreign legal system to the receiving system. Some legal systems are 
naturally more proximate than others. Usually this is because they belong 
to the same so-called legal family. Thus, Gorla turned first from Italian law 
to French law, because it was part of the same legal family. Common 
lawyers naturally look first to common law systems. 
Basil Markesinis has argued that “[n]ecessity, practical commercial 
necessity, is what will make the study of foreign law grow further and 
deeper, not dreamers of the past nor trendy preachers of the present.”87 I 
think Waldron shows that there is a deeper underlying reason. But whereas 
Waldron thinks of the principles as a common enterprise, I think that may 
go too far. There is a perceived common set of problems and the foreign 
system shows how they may be resolved. But the result is the need for 
thinking within a domestic system. We need the catalyst. 
 
 85. CATHERINE DUPRÉ, IMPORTING THE LAW IN POST-COMMUNIST TRANSITIONS 167-71, 183-84 
(2003). 
 86. Id. at 174-75. 
 87. BASIL MARKESINIS, COMPARATIVE LAW IN THE COURTROOM AND IN THE CLASSROOM 66 
(2003) (emphasis added). 
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B. How does the Foreign Law Argument Work? 
In Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd.,88 Lord Bingham 
argued: 
[If] . . . a decision is given in this country which offends against one’s 
basic sense of justice, and if consideration of international sources 
suggests that a different and more acceptable decision would be given 
in most other jurisdictions, whatever their legal tradition, this must 
prompt anxious review of the decision in question. In a shrinking 
world . . . there must be some virtue in uniformity of outcome 
whatever the diversity of approach in reaching that outcome. 
The function of the foreign legal example is to trigger internal enquiry 
to find out why the host system appears to achieve a different result. In that 
sense, its first function is methodological: to encourage more serious 
thinking about one’s own system. Care needs to be given to the idea of 
uniformity of outcome, particularly when it comes to deciding cases. 
Judicial decisions rarely see the totality of a problem and it is often not 
submitted to the judges in that form. As a result, it will be quite frequent 
that a difference in outcome appears on that very specific point. But, as I 
have said, the benchmark for evaluation is the outcome taken in the round. 
The judge’s objective is to look at what others do and come to a way 
of developing her own law that is both consistent internally and coherent 
with the objectives that have been identified externally. The foreign 
material adds luster to the national solution. But the judge starts with the 
national or code-based set of principles and then seeks to apply them to the 
problems before her. Foreign materials help us to explore solutions that are 
out of the box from a domestic law point of view. 
Any solution adopted gains luster from three features. First, the 
foreign solution must fit with the problem as it presents itself in the host 
system. To take an example, German law has specific problems with 
liability for others, because under §831 of the German Civil Code, there is 
only a presumption of fault that can be rebutted by showing that the 
employer chose a competent employee or supervised him appropriately.89 
This leads German lawyers to adopt solutions in contract to get around this 
problem.90 The rules on vicarious liability are differently constructed in 
French and English laws, so the legal problem does not present itself in the 
same way. 
 
 88. Fairchild v. Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd., [2002] UKHL 22, 32 (U.K.). 
 89. See MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 20, at 700. 
 90. Id. at 693-709. 
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Second, to have weight, the foreign approach must be consistent with 
internal legal principle in the host system. For example in the area of 
product liability in the 1960s, American direct, strict liability of the 
manufacturer was rejected in Italy and Germany, because it did not fit with 
existing legal principles. A presumption of fault was adopted, because this 
was more consistent with legal principle. 
The third feature in creating luster to an argument is the reputation of 
the system in question. As noted above, this breaks down into three 
aspects: prestige, relevance, and proximity.91 Markesinis makes a 
convincing argument that receptivity to foreign influences is a matter of 
mentality among the judges.92 In particular, he suggests this may be partly 
due to the education and experiences of individual judges,93 but also to a 
general mood within the legal system.94 Catherine Dupré has picked this up 
in relation to the use of German constitutional court decisions in the 
development of Hungarian constitutional law. German constitutional law 
had a reputation for having developed a robust system or protecting rights 
after the experience of dictatorship, an outcome to which the Hungarians 
aspired.95 The importance of reputation for modernity and for experience 
with the problems was important for the influence of America on Italy and 
Germany in relation to product liability. America was seen as the place 
with experience of the modern problem of defective products and of having 
identified it as a distinct social problem, rather than losing it within the 
more general categories of sale or delict. 
In addition, the reputation of a foreign system may depend on the way 
it is presented in translation.  Guido Alpa makes the point that, in the 
nineteenth century, there were many translations of works on English law 
by leading writers.96 But they did not lead to any influence from the 
common law on Italian private law. The reason he suggests is that those 
English authors who were translated generally criticised English law as 
archaic and unsystematic. If national lawyers were not enthusiastic about 
the merits of their own system, why should foreign lawyers take it 
seriously?97 (This was in contrast to the enthusiasm expressed by many of 
 
 91. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
 92. See Basil Markesinis, Judicial Mentality: Mental Disposition or Outlook as a Factor Impeding 
Recourse to Foreign Law, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1325 (2006). 
 93. Id. at 1356-59 (examining the German courts). 
 94. See generally MARKESINIS & FEDTKE, supra note 1 (considering not only U.S. Courts, but 
also French ordinary courts). 
 95. DUPRÉ, supra note 85, at 99-101. 
 96. ALPA, supra note 15, at 376-77. 
 97. Id. at 380-81, 387. 
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the same authors for the British constitution, and that enthusiasm was 
influential.) This has an intimate connection with how the country is 
perceived. Markesinis rightly stresses the accessibility of legal systems. It 
is most noticeable that translations feature heavily in chains of connection. 
To take a simple point, in product liability, the discussion of American law 
by the German Bundesgerichtshof in the Fowlpest decision relies on the 
work of Lorenz,98 the discussion of it by the Italian Corte di cassazione 
almost certainly relies on Gorla,99 and that by the Advocate General 
Tesauro in the European Court of Justice relies on an Italian author, 
Ponzarelli .100 “Packaging” is a way in which Markesinis suggests material 
needs to be given, and he is fundamentally right. Third, reputation depends 
also on the receptivity of the receiving system. In both the Hungarian and 
the product liability situations, a key vector in achieving this receptivity in 
the receiving system was the presence of individuals who had studied or 
visited the foreign country for an extended period of time. Prior familiarity 
creates this form of willingness to consider a foreign system as having 
something desirable to offer. 
This discussion of the reputation and presentation of foreign sources 
helps us to understand their place in the process of discovery. It helps us 
see why national lawyers might think it useful to look at foreign sources 
and how they might be able to access them. But it does not explain why 
these foreign sources carry argumentative force. For this, we need to turn to 
the more jurisprudential work of Waldron. 
IV. THE JUSTIFICATORY FORCE OF FOREIGN CITATIONS 
This article has suggested that foreign citations typically have 
argumentative force because they encourage revised interpretations of 
national sources. So the new argument is based directly on national sources 
and only indirectly on foreign sources. But there are those who would wish 
to give foreign citations a more direct authority. One such author is Jeremy 
Waldron. 
A. Common Enterprise: The Rule of Law 
Waldron offers two arguments for treating foreign sources as 
justifications for decisions in domestic courts. 101 The first is that the 
 
 98. See BGHZ, supra note 52, at 91, 93-96; MARKESINIS & UNBERATH, supra note 20, at 560. 
 99. See Martorano, supra note 42. 
 100. Case C-300/95, Comm’n v. U.K. 1997 E.C.R. I-2649 ¶ 16,n.4 (citing GIULIO PONZARELLI, LA 
RESPONSABILITA CIVILE. PROFILI DI DIRITTO COMPARATO (1992)). 
 101. HIGHEST COURTS, supra note 4, at 103-07. 
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foreign system provides an example of the methodology for resolving legal 
problems. The second is that the argument of equal treatment applies, even 
though the states involved in the comparison are not the same. I will add an 
additional argument from human flourishing. But I will also argue that such 
justifications for the force of foreign law citations as a distinct legal reason 
are limited. They are limited because of the level of generality involved in 
identifying common legal tasks across legal systems. In addition, any 
comparative lawyer knows that you simply cannot compare legal rules or 
legal outcomes without situating them in context. You need to see a 
particular task that law performs in the light of other tasks that law 
performs in a country and in relation to the tasks that other social 
institutions perform. Put into that broader context, the comparability of a 
foreign jurisdiction with the domestic jurisdiction may be more limited 
than at first appears. 
In the first argument, Waldron suggests that, even where domestic 
courts are not applying a common set of binding rules with the foreign 
system, that nation still has access to doctrinal and other solutions for 
handling common problems. He rejects the idea that legal systems are just 
trying to find the solution that fits the genius or culture of their own 
society. They are looking to the best application of principles of justice in 
their own setting. Because the domestic court is also looking to apply the 
same principles, the solutions the foreign court adopted have a value as 
methodological illustrations of how to conduct the exercise of finding the 
right solution to a problem, as well as of how to justify a possible outcome. 
Waldron lauds judges who check that their approach is the sensible way of 
tackling a problem by learning from the method adopted by judges in other 
jurisdictions.102 But the issue of showing that the outcome is right requires 
a stronger argument: that the national rules are based on the same 
fundamental principles.103 
Waldron’s second argument on equal treatment has two distinct 
alternatives. The first and most distinctive of the Waldron approach is to 
examine what he calls “bottom-up demand for consistency.”104 In brief, this 
means focusing on those in differing jurisdictions who are subject to 
divergent treatment, but are otherwise in similar situations. He gives the 
analogy of humanitarian agencies operating in a refugee camp. If a British 
charity, Oxfam, operating in the north of the camp gives the refugees two 
meals a day, and other agencies operating in the south give them only one 
 
 102. See id. at 102-04, 108 (citing example of Hopkinson v. Police). 
 103. Id. at 106. 
 104. Id. at 114. 
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meal a day, different refugees in different parts of the camp get different 
treatment. They will complain, but do they have any grounds of complaint? 
They are aware of the different treatment of others and are (at least 
humanly speaking) understandably distressed by the disparity of treatment. 
He argues: 
People in one country are aware of the way individual rights are 
accorded to others, similarly situated in another country. They know 
that their government is supposed to be responding to the same 
principles, the same concerns, and the same circumstances as the other 
governments, and so they wonder about fairness and why different 
governments have not got their act together to ensure that, in this 
world, like cases are treated alike.105 
In other words, citizens complain that the same broad principles 
should lead to the same results despite institutional or geographical 
difference. The core of the argument is that the law is a search for a right 
answer to the application of certain principles which has to be “figured 
out.”106 In this he is arguing that, despite the institutional distinctiveness of 
the nation states, they need to be seen together. There is something like a 
common enterprise between legal systems. So, going back to the 
illustrations in Part II, courts of all western countries could be seen to be 
faced by similar problems in a consumer society, and so the results for 
consumers in one country, such as Germany, should be similar to other 
countries where the context is similar, such as the United States. 
Waldron’s second argument is that the ius gentium (law of all nations) 
acts as an intellectual clearing house of ideas. He argues: 
It was a settled and embedded consensus derived from these principles 
having become established in practice as actual legal arrangements all 
over the known and civilized world. It was not natural law, though it 
was informed by natural law. Though it was a cosmopolitan idea, it 
was down-to-earth cosmopolitanism, ‘a brooding omnipresence on the 
ground,’ if you like.107 
Again he appeals to a kind of common enterprise. The decisions of 
foreign courts are part of a common stock of potential solutions for 
handling common problems and, domestic courts, in fairness to domestic 
litigants, should refer to these. There is a common enterprise, such that we 
 
 105. Id. at 110. 
 106. See Jeremy Waldron, Partly Laws Common to All Mankind: Foreign Law in American Courts, 
Part 3, Yale Law School Community Server (Sept. 12, 2007), http://cs.law.yale.edu/blogs/podcasts/ 
archive/2007/10/11/partly-laws-common-to-all-mankind-foreign-law-in-american-courts-part-3.aspx. 
 107. HIGHEST COURTS, supra note 4, at 114. 
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should learn from those who are engaged in the same enterprise. This is 
why he argues that, for the purposes of the protection of human rights, we 
are all part of a single community.108 It is that basic assumption that 
grounds the argument of global fairness. It is why there is a link between 
the nature of law and the use of foreign law. Unlike Markesinis, I do not 
think the argument is entirely utilitarian. Like Waldron, I think it has to be 
principled because giving reasons for actions (legislation or judicial 
decisions) is a principled activity. 
In this article, I focus primarily on the argument that equal treatment 
requires the consultation of foreign legal arguments and their use as part of 
a legal justification. In order to develop the idea that foreign legal 
arguments provide a justification within our own domestic law, one needs 
to expand on Waldron’s argument, making it relevant to private law. I do 
this in two stages. The first stage examines the nature of the “common legal 
enterprise;” the second examines the actual practice of legal influence in 
private law, recalling the earlier example from product liability. 
In what way is law a “common legal enterprise” across a multiplicity 
of countries? At a high level of abstraction, Hans Kelsen was right that 
governance through law is a mark of social progress.109 That progress is 
about the control of social power, power of individuals and power of the 
State. Such an exercise of controlling power provides the elements of a 
common agenda. That common agenda provides a basis for a dialogue 
between legal systems, each seeking to learn from the other. This is true in 
three ways. First, governance through law provides social order. Second, 
the rule of law provides a control on the arbitrariness of the executive. 
Third, the protection of fundamental rights provides a control over the 
exercise of social power in the interests of the promotion of social well-
being. These are three generic values that governance through law 
achieves, but at this generic level, they provide common points of reference 
for different legal systems. Such ideas reflect a broad conception of the rule 
of law. It includes fundamental rights, encourages the independence of the 
judiciary, and provides conditions for the exercise of rights. Lord Bingham 
has suggested that this “thick theory” of the rule of law is to be preferred 
these days.110 My colleague Trevor Allan argues that the rule of law has an 
 
 108. See id. at 109 (arguing that this is a demand of peoples, and not just rulers). 
 109. See generally HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal. Press 
1967) (1934). 
 110. TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 67 (Allen Lane eds., 2010). See generally the Dehli 
Statement of the International Commission of Jurists in NORMAN S. MARSH, THE RULE OF LAW IN A 
FREE SOCIETY: A REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF JURISTS, NEW DEHLI, INDIA, 
JANUARY 5-10, 1959 (Int’l Comm’n of Jurists, 1959). 
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ethical imperative based on values common to all modern liberal 
democracies.111 Applied to private law, such a thick conception of the rule 
of law entails respect for rights. But, in the end, these are abstract and 
general features of the ambitions of a legal system. It does not necessarily 
mean that the specific areas that the law regulates, such as products, are 
indeed necessarily common enterprises across legal systems. This has to be 
shown in each case. 
Going beyond Waldron, the other argument for seeing law as a 
common enterprise focuses on the role of law in making possible the social 
conditions for human flourishing. The conditions of welfare, as well as 
economic and social rights that attach to this idea are contested. It is here 
that the notion of the “social welfare state” (sozialer Rechtsstaat) has been 
used.112 Although there may be disagreement about how this works out in 
particular branches of the law, it is certainly a common ambition which 
goes beyond classical areas of fundamental rights. 
B. Common Principles 
If law performs certain tasks that are common across the world, or at 
least in developed countries, then it becomes natural that these countries 
should look at how these tasks are performed elsewhere. This can be the 
basis of the common principles to which Waldron alluded. Of course, there 
is a significant level of generality involved in the description of the 
common principles or tasks. Indeed, they might well be described as 
categories of tasks, rather than specific tasks. There are lots of ways in 
which to establish order in society, lots of ways in which to embody the 
rule of law; lots of disagreement about what constitute fundamental rights 
or human flourishing. But the international character of debates on these 
matters can be seen in any work.113 
Where there is a common function, the strength of an argument drawn 
from a foreign law about the performance of that function is that it offers a 
different perspective on that shared task. Waldron’s argument that people 
can legitimately claim against their government that they are not being 
treated equally to people in other countries in the performance of common 
tasks has some force. But context imposes a significant limitation on its 
force. It may be true that the victim of a traffic accident does not obtain 
 
 111. See generally TREVOR R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE 
RULE OF LAW (2001). 
 112. Erich Fechner, Future Prospects of the Sozialer Rechtsstaat, in LAW AND THE FUTURE OF 
SOCIETY 146 (Francis Charles Hutley, Eugene Kamenka & Alice Erh-Soon Tay eds., 1979). 
 113. See e.g., Jean Rivero, Etat de droit, Etat du droit, in L’ETAT DE DROIT. MELANGES EN 
L’HONNEUR DE GUY BRAIBANT 609-614 (Marceau Long & G. Vedel eds., 1996). 
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compensation without proof of fault before the courts of one country, but 
does in another. But is it unfair? If in the second system there is a strong 
national health service provided by the state and a strong social welfare 
system of benefits for those unable to work, then it is not clear that a 
pedestrian who is unable to sue the car driver in tort without proving fault 
has been badly treated, even if a pedestrian in another system is able to do 
so. We can only form a serious judgment about inequality of treatment if 
we take a holistic view of the victim’s situation. That requires us to look 
not only at the law, but at other social mechanisms. The danger of 
Waldron’s example of the refugee camp is that he concentrates on one 
feature (meals per day) and does not draw our attention to the other features 
of the situation. As I said at the beginning of this Part, it is a commonplace 
of comparative law that you simply cannot compare legal rules or legal 
outcomes without situating them in context. When we look at private law, 
for example in relation to products, the law has compensation mechanisms 
in contract and tort and also regulation through the criminal law.114 The 
relationship between the three differs from system to system.115 In addition, 
some systems have developed compensation mechanisms outside tort law 
for particular causes of damage. If one is going to cite foreign law, then one 
needs to be aware of the context in which the rules you are citing operate in 
their foreign system, so that a genuine comparability can be established. 
CONCLUSION 
When a judge in one system cites a case from another system, he can 
be claiming that this is evidence of a common principle of law or of the 
right way to interpret an international instrument which is part of his 
domestic law. But these will be the minority of situations when foreign 
case law is cited. In most cases, the foreign judicial decision is being 
offered as a way of gaining a perspective on arguments already available 
within domestic law—the divergent ways in which the rules can be 
legitimately formulated and interpreted. To the extent that the social and 
political situation of the foreign jurisdiction are similar to that of the 
domestic law, I would follow Waldron in thinking that it does add some 
force to domestic arguments. The sense of fairness that similar situations 
should receive similar solutions across legal systems has some weight, even 
if the full force depends on a closer and holistic analysis of the way a 
problem is treated by a legal system. Additionally, the foreign decision 
provides a reflecting mirror to observe our own system and the options it 
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has for development. It provides a counterfactual world in which 
consequences can be tested, not merely hypothetically, but in some form of 
grounded reality. But the argument of the paper has been that the force of 
the eventual argument that is presented to justify a new judicial decision 
remains firmly grounded in domestic law. If the reasons are not convincing 
in domestic law, then no amount of foreign law is going to make them good 
enough. Only where there is a sufficient body of individuals with authority 
available in the host legal system can the luster added by foreign law do 
any good. Foreign law is not a completely new argument, but provides 
additional support to the arguments already available in the host domestic 
legal system. To that extent, there is no difference between private law and 
constitutional law. In constitutional law, one also has to find sources in the 
domestic law which can then be enhanced or made more appealing by 
reference to foreign law. 
 
